Despite a plethora of articles and now a book on the topic of physician refusal of ineffective or so-called "futile" treatment, there is still no definitive court ruling on the subject nor a consensus in the bioethics or medical communities on the issue. 1 What is involved in the dispute is not only the limits, if any, of patient or parental determination of medical treatment but the role of professional integrity and of the physician's commitment to do no harm. 2 When the clash between autonomy and physician values involves the emotionally laden case of a seriously compromised neonate, as is true in the case of Baby S, the difficulty is compounded.
CASE
Baby S was a 2960-gm female infant born at 35 weeks' gestation to a 19-year-old gravida 1, para 1 mother. Due to patient noncompliance, only sporadic prenatal care was provided at an outlying facility. Pregnancy was complicated by gonococcal and chlamydia infections. Fetal ultrasound, performed elsewhere at 30 weeks' gestation, reportedly demonstrated hydrocephaly. The physicians who ultimately delivered the infant did not know that fact when the mother presented in labor to the emergency department as an unregistered patient. Ultrasound on admission revealed fetal hydrocephalus and breech presentation. Hence, the decision was made to deliver the fetus by cesarean section. Apgar scores were 6 and 7 at 1 and 5 minutes, respectively. The infant required resuscitation with tactile stimulation and bag-mask ventilation with 100% oxygen. After initial stabilization, she was admitted to the neonatal intensive care unit. Upon admission, significant physical findings included a 45-cm head circumference (the 50th percentile for this birth weight is 32 to 33 cm) and bilateral corneal opacities, diagnosed as congenital glaucoma. A grade II/VI systolic ejection murmur was noted. Peripheral pulses in the lower extremities were diminished. Cranial ultrasound and CT scan confirmed severe hydrocephalus and demonstrated large intraventricular hemorrhages with a Dandy-Walker malformation. Echocardiogram examination showed severe coarctation of the aorta, a small transverse aortic arch, a large patent ductus arteriosus, with right-to-left shunting, and small ventricular and atrial septal defects. The baby initially was treated with supplemental oxygen, administered by head hood, but developed worsening respiratory distress that required tracheal intubation and mechanical ventilation on the second day of life. The parents were informed of the infant's poor clinical status and grave prognosis; they asked that no aggressive measures be utilized.
On the sixth day of life the parents changed their minds. They now wanted "everything done." At the parents' insistence, pediatric neurosurgery, pediatric cardiology, cardiac surgery, and ophthalmology were consulted. A prostaglandin (PG) E 1 infusion was started. On the 11th day of life, a palliative ventriculoperitoneal shunt was placed to ease nursing care. The infant's neurologic condition continued to deteriorate. The infant was less responsive to stimulation, had little spontaneous movement and had little respiratory drive. Two days later a cardiac catheterization was performed to further delineate the cardiac anatomy in anticipation of surgical correction. Over the next 2 days, while awaiting cardiac surgery, the infant's cardiorespiratory status worsened. Cardiac surgery was postponed. Two days later the infant suffered a cardiopulmonary arrest. The infant was successfully resuscitated after receiving chest compressions and intravenous epinephrine. Over the next several days the infant continued to do poorly.
Given the infant's neurologic devastation and grim prognosis, the cardiac surgeon believed surgery was not appropriate. The parents accepted the surgeon's decision not to perform the surgery, but insisted that other aggressive measures, including mechanical ventilation and PGE 1 , be continued.
Two days later, despite full ventilatory support, the infant's heart rate and arterial oxygen saturation dropped. In the judgment of the attending neonatologist, further attempts at resuscitation were not justified. The parents were informed of that decision and that a do-not-resuscitate (DNR) order would be placed into the infant's chart. They were not asked to agree to or concur the DNR order. Over the next several days, the infant's clinical condition remained essentially unchanged. Six days later, the PGE 1 infusion was discontinued. Within 48 hours, the infant died.
COMMENTARY
Although parental desires for a healthy baby are dashed with the birth of a compromised child, the hope for a "medical miracle" or a tech-
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nological "fix" frequently remains the driving force of parental decision-making. This can occur even in the face of relentless setbacks and complications. For many of these parents there can be no thought of giving up, let along stopping or withdrawing treatment. Historically, as Peabody and Martin have observed, parents have been empowered as the natural surrogate decision-makers for the health care of their children. 3 It is they, as Duff and Campbell noted in their landmark 1973 essay on "Moral and Ethical Dilemmas in the Special Care Nursery," who have the responsibilities for the child and so it is they who should make the life-death decision. That standard, sensitive as it is to the plight of families compelled to bear the burden of a profoundly disabled infant "rescued" by modern technology, is too narrowly framed. It provides no guidelines, no standards, no norms on which to base the decision to withdraw or withhold treatment. Such decisions, as we have noted elsewhere, could equally be made in concern for siblings or "family convenience" as the best interests of the child. 4 The general consensus that treatment decisions belong exclusively to the parents ended with the "Baby Doe" controversy in the early 1980s. 5 The parents' decision in the now infamous Bloomington, IN Baby Doe case, in which an infant with Downs syndrome and esophageal atresia was allowed to die untreated, shifted the focus from parents to infants. Children are now seen not merely as the property of their parents, but as patients having independent rights. The implication is that, although parents may continue to be involved in the decision-making for their children, they do not have the sole right to refuse medical interventions for the infant. It is the child's best interests, not the parents wishes, that is to prevail.
That concern for the best interest of the child ought to govern decisions to continue treatment as well as those to withhold or withdraw it. The criticism of "normlessness" made against Duff and Campbell's approach to withholding or withdrawing medical treatment applies as well to Veatch and Spicer's belief that families have a right to demand, and physicians an obligation to provide, whatever life-prolonging treatments the family requests. 6 Veatch goes so far as to insist that, if no other physician can be found who is willing to provide the requested treatment, the attending physician is obliged to do so. This holds true, he argues, even if a surrogate's request "deviates intolerably" from established standards or is, from the physician's perspective, "grossly inappropriate."
Veatch's position applied to this case places the physician in a terrible dilemma. It would require the physician to relentlessly impose aggressive procedures on devastated infants-even in the face of overwhelming evidence that the interventions can not reverse the child's condition. Applied to the present case, one must ask should Baby S undergo cardiac surgery to correct the coarctation of the aorta? Should she be subjected to long-term ventilation? Should she be forced to endure repeated attempts at cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR)?
These issues were raised in dramatic form by Hackler and Hiller 7 in an essay in which they described their experience with a 6-year-old child who had over a period of 10 months had undergone multiple abdominal surgeries and repeated resuscitation. 8 The physicians did not believe there was any hope of survival; hospital policy, however, required approval by the next of kin for DNR status. In that case the mother refused to consider any limitation of treatment. As the authors' report, "During her final resuscitation, [the patient] was asystolic for 30 -45 minutes. Her mother was called during the course of resuscitation but would not allow it to be stopped." The physicians under the mother's urging succeeded in re-establishing heartbeat in what was now a neurologically devastated child. These authors pleaded for a better approach to the care of the hopelessly dying child. To find such a direction it is important to understand how we got ourselves into such a bind.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The uniquely American phenomenon of complying with any family request is chronicled in Edmund Pellegrino's historical survey of the 30-year history of bioethics. 9 The shift from physician paternalism to patient involvement in decision-making to the now near-absolute claims of the patient or proxy's choices is the result of a combination of forces that have occurred over the last three decades. Among the factors leading to this outcome are the development of sophisticated life-prolonging technologies, the rise of third-party coverage, and the elevation of individual over communal values.
The shift of focus to autonomy with its concomitant requirement of informed consent soon translated into the belief that respect for autonomy mandated not only patient or family involvement in decision-making, but requires the physician to do whatever the patient or family desires. Such a situation has led physicians to ask if they are, in fact, obliged to do what they believe to be futile or ineffective. The so-called "futility" debate centers primarily on CPR and the requirement of patient or family consent for DNR orders. It is now well documented that in certain clearly defined categories of patients there is near 100% mortality. 10 In light of these data, Blackhall 11 argues that in such circumstances, even if the family requests CPR, the physician should refuse. In such instances she states, "the issue of patient autonomy is irrelevant." It is irrelevant because in such cases the requested intervention would be ineffective or futile.
Although the medical literature continues to bombard us with articles on "medical futility," 12 there is no agreement on what the term means or what implications it conveys. As Younger 13 has queried, does it signify absolute impossibility? Is it purely physiological? Does it include the ability to revive heartbeat but not to achieve discharge from the hospital? How much quality of life and social value does the term embrace?
Lantos and colleagues 14 have noted that there is no consensus on the meaning of the term even among physicians. Physicians disagree on both the chances of success and on the goals of therapy. Some invoke futility only if the success rate is 0%, whereas others declare a treatment futile with a success rate as high as 18%. Furthermore, social and psychologic factors may cloud a physician's estimate of success. For example, some consider liver transplantation for an alco-holic patient futile because of the likelihood of recidivism. Others consider a treatment futile if all it can provide is a chance for a couple of days or weeks in an intensive care unit. But as Lantos notes, "Such a goal can be of supreme value to a dying patient or the patient's family."
This lack of agreement on the meaning of the term and its already abundant misuse as a shorthand way for physicians to truncate discussions on treatment decisions make it ever more apparent that its usefulness in the medical lexicon has been short-lived. Perhaps as Truog 15 has suggested, its rapid intrusion into bioethics should be met by its equally swift demise.
Jettisoning this new buzzword would be no loss. The debate on futility not only distracts, it distorts the real issue. It is not the meaning of a word but the moral basis of the participant's actions that ought to be the focus of our attention. Is there any limit to the physician's obligation to honor a patient's demands for treatment? Must the physician, if asked, always use whatever is required to preserve life?
REFRAMING THE DEBATE
Physicians' ethical obligation to act as moral agents, to exercise independent judgment on the extent to which their ministrations could help or harm the patient, was the basis for our essay on the use of extracorporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO) for an older child in multi-system organ failure. 16 In that case the physicians at the University of Chicago's Children's Hospital refused the pleas of the parents to continue life-sustaining ECMO for a 5-year-old boy who had sustained irreversible bilateral pulmonary contusions in a fall out a second-story window. Although the ECMO machine could have served as a high-tech artificial lung for the child, and thereby extended the life of the neurologically devastated patient for weeks or even months until he finally succumbed to renal or hepatic failure, we believed that such an action was not warranted.
A similar situation arose in the recent Gilgunn case in which the treating physicians at the Massachusetts General Hospital, with the approval of the Chair of that institution's Optimal Care Committee, wrote a DNR order, over the vehement protests of the patient's daughter and guardian, on a neurologically devastated 72-year-old woman with multisystem failure, metabolic bone disease, and disseminated intravascular coagulopathy. 17 After the patient died without any attempts being made at cardiopulmonary resuscitation, the daughter sued the physicians and hospital for their failure to honor her demands that everything possible be done to save her mother's life. A jury quickly found that the physicians and hospital had not breached their duty of care toward the patient for the failure to heed the daughter's demands.
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LIMITED SCOPE OF BABY K
Baby K, the case in which the federal Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a federal district court's ruling that physicians at Virginia's Fairfax Hospital had to honor a mother's request for ventilatory support for her anencephalic infant, 19 has caused great confusion and fear among physicians who believe the ruling mandated that physicians provide whatever life-prolonging interventions a parent demands.
That apprehension is misplaced. Baby K does not directly address the question of physician refusal of inappropriate treatment. In that case the federal courts were concerned with the statutory interpretation of the federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) 20 requiring emergency department staff to stabilize patients before they may be transferred. As the Fourth Circuit Court specifically noted, it was not giving direction on the issue of the limits, if any, of patient autonomy.
Annas' observation that the scope of Baby K is confined to the very narrow issue of emergency department treatment was confirmed by a subsequent ruling of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Bryran v. Rectors and Trustees of the University of Virginia 21 in which that court noted that the EMTALA statute applied only to stabilizing a patient on initial presentation in the emergency department. The Fourth Circuit ruling in Bryan made it clear that a decision to write a DNR order over a family's objections on a patient who had been stabilized and is being cared for in the hospital is not covered by the EMTALA statute or by its ruling in Baby K. Such actions the Court ruled are governed not by federal statutes but by traditional state malpractice standards. Hence, it is "standard of care," not federal legislation that is to guide physician behavior with regard to the treatment of hospitalized patients.
Issues in Physician Refusal
The issues faced by the physician in a case such as Baby S are twofold: the appropriate medical care of the patient and the response to the parent who, despite all medical evidence, insists the patient will recover with the provision of "everything possible."
Medical decision-making is an issue neither of physician domination nor of complete patient self-determination. These determinations are not exclusively scientific judgments; they are, rather, value assumptions about the nature and value of mortal life. As such they belong to a broader community than medicine alone. The question is not whether but which value judgments physicians may use in determining whether to follow patient demands. That question, as Tomlinson and Brody 22 note, signals a turn away from individual toward social conceptions of the reasonableness and worthwhileness of the proposed procedure. It is not the personal predilections of the provider nor the idiosyncratic views of the patient but the common social sense of the approved practices that is to prevail. Without this social consensus on the values and ends that undergird medical practice, we will inevitably and unfortunately be forced to turn increasingly to judicial and governmental involvement in these decisions.
To achieve social support for the acceptance of standards of care, physicians' professional societies should provide well-reasoned substantive guidelines for their practice policies. Fortunately, criteria for the treatment of profoundly compromised or neurologically devastated patients such as Baby L, 23 Baby K, and Baby S have been devel-oped by the President's Commission and by multiple specialty societies. 24 These medical groups agree with the President's Commission that the only justification for instituting or continuing aggressive medical interventions on such patients is the judgment by the physician that the treatment will be effective in restoring the patient to consciousness. Without that expectation, not only is there no obligation to proceed with aggressive medical treatments, the physician has no mandate from either society or the profession to do so.
In the case of Baby S the parents insistence on maximal treatment resulted in multiple interventions over a 5-week period, including cardiac catheterization, a plan for surgical correction of the coarctation of the aorta, and a full cardiac resuscitation. Sepsis, liver failure, and significant pulmonary compromise lead the surgeon to conclude that the infant was no longer an acceptable candidate for cardiac surgery. Once that occurred, the issue of the appropriate care of the patient shifted. Although she could be repeatedly resuscitated and sustained in the neonatal intensive care unit for a prolonged period, the question remained whether CPR is the standard of care for a neurologically devastated patient whose cardiac status is beyond repair.
The University of Chicago Hospitals, unlike the facility described in the Hackler and Hiller essay, has a DNR policy that allows the writing of a DNR order over the objections of the family. That policy, which has been in place since 1994, reads in part as follows:
. . . a DNR order should be written if the attending physician determines that an attempt to perform CPR is not medically indicated because it has no reasonable chance of success. The determination that CPR is not medically indicated should be made by the attending physician based on the patient's clinical status, the medical literature on CPR for patients with a similar status, and the experience of the Hospitals' physicians with similar patients. When CPR attempts are not medically indicated, the attending physician should discuss this with the patient and family. . . . The patient or family's consent, however, is not required to write a DNR order when CPR attempts are not medically indicated.
In the case of Baby S the attending physician, after consultation with her neonatal colleagues, the neonatal intensive care unit team, and sustained ethical review of the case with ethics consultants and by the hospital ethics committee, determined that further use of CPR would not serve the infant's best interests. The attending physician spoke with the parents and informed them that, while she would honor their request to maintain ventilatory support, no additional aggressive measures to sustain the infant's life would be utilized. That meant that in conformity with the hospital policy a DNR order would be entered into the infant's chart. The parents, who had rejected any proposal to "pull the plug" on their child, acceded to the treatment plan.
Since the infant was no longer a candidate for cardiac surgery, all measures undertaken in preparation for the surgery were canceled. This included the discontinuation of the PGE 1 infusion that had been provided to maintain patency of the ductus arteriosus until surgery could repair the infant's aorta. Baby S died the next day.
A NOTE OF CAUTION
There are, of course, risks in granting physicians the authority to set medical standards that will prevail against patient requests for lifesustaining interventions. As we observed in a cautionary note on Baby L, the potential for abuse demands safeguards to insure that appeal to prevailing standards alone not be a sufficient basis to override treatment requests. Minimally, such decisions should be openly made, principled, and focused on the patient. They also should include agreement among the health care providers, the concurrence of an ethics committee, openness to a second opinion, willingness to cooperate in the transfer of the patient, and sound documentation in the permanent medical record.
